The complainants and their bargaining agent made a complaint under sections 7, 10 and 11 of the Canadian Human Rights Act R.S.C. 1985, C-H-6(CHRA), alleging that the FI-01 and FI-02 group and levels are female dominated and discriminated against and that the FI classification standard and indeed the entire classification system are discriminatory – the CHRC referred the complaint to the PSLRB – the respondent objected to the PSLRB’s jurisdiction to hear the complaint on the basis that it does not have jurisdiction over the classification issues raised in it – it argued that the aspect related to classification should remain with the CHRC – the Vice-Chairperson held that Parliament did not intend to bifurcate complaints during the transitional period before the Public Service Equitable Compensation Act (PSECA) is proclaimed in force – the transitional provisions contained in the BIA provide a comprehensive regime to address pay equity complaints made before the PSECA comes into force, and that regime gives the PSLRB the additional power to interpret and apply the CHRA and the Equal Wages Guidelines, 1986 [SOR 86/1082] – the respondent’s assertion that bargaining over wages occurs without any reference to the classification standard or levels would require evidentiary support during a full hearing – proving whether the classification standard is required to meet the criteria contained in the Equal Wages Guidelines, 1986, would require evidence – the overall intent of the transitional provisions was that the PSLRB should stand in the shoes of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal to dispose of complaints in the interim period – the reference in the BIA to sections 7 and 10 of the CHRA “...in respect of the employer establishing or maintaining differences in wages...” was designed to distinguish pay equity complaints from the other types of complaints that can be made under those sections – an intent to bifurcate the process for pay equity complaints would have to have been set out explicitly in the legislation – the use of the same statutory language as the CHRA supports the view that, during the transition period, complainants have the same rights as they would have had under the CHRA – the respondent’s request that the 180-day requirement contained in subsection 396(6) start afresh was refused – the complainants were directed to provide further particulars to the respondent on effective date of the complaint.

Objection dismissed.

Directions given.