Following the publication of Treasury Board v. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, 2010 PSLRB 15, the parties jointly requested that the Board convene to consider whether the content of an ESA was limited to the three elements listed (types of positions, number of positions and specific positions) in the definition of “essential services agreement” in subsection 4(1) of the Act – although the Board had ordered the inclusion of essential services definitions in past ESAs, issue estoppel did not apply as there was no evidence that the Board had considered specific submissions on its jurisdiction to do so and that it had ruled definitively on the matter – this proceeding was not a collateral attack or an abuse of process – the Board must be guided by its rulings about the meaning and intent of the essential services features of the Act – paragraphs 4(1)(a)-(c) of the definition of “essential services agreement” have no comprehensible meaning without the modifying reference to essential services – the presence of both definitions together in subsection 4(1) offers a strong indication that the definition of ESA must be interpreted harmoniously with the paired definition of essential services – the legislator formulated the two relevant definitions in subsection 4(1) as a coherent and integrated whole – without an agreed or deemed definition of essential services, an ESA would be empty of its defining context – if the definition of essential services is not a matter that can be included in an ESA, the Board could not exercise its authority to define essential services in the first place, and both parties agreed that the Board had that authority – the provisions about amending an existing ESA provide further support for that view – the applicant’s position discounted the extent to which the legislative regime governing essential services changed under the Act – it is not a position-based scheme but a service-based scheme – the Board rejected the applicant’s position that a description of essential services in an ESA is irrelevant for the purposes of a strike as one purpose of the Act is ensuring that services essential to public safety or security continue during a strike – there is no room in the Board’s approach to accommodate the proposition that the employer’s management rights permit it to require the performance of non-essential duties as a condition of employment, but the Board left those issues to another day – overarching practical requirements are that employees must know precisely the services that they are required to perform in the event of a strike and that they should not be expected to intuit those services from a list of positions in an ESA.

Directions given.